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ABSTRACT  
Although the variety of  different ethical concerns regarding nanotechnologies has been 
recognized, there is a diffused dissatisfaction in the debate. Nanoethics has been often 
reduced to a mere check list of  concerns or to a sophisticated form of  risk and benefit 
analysis. The debate is not innovative anymore and suffers from repetition. Although the 
traditional tools of  bioethical analysis can be useful for dealing with nanotechnological 
applications which are already existent or in the pipeline, for a deep engagement with 
future possible applications the ethical analysis should go beyond the idea of  applying 
abstract ethical principles.  
Aims of  this paper is to propose an alternative way for the normative reflection on those 
(nano)technological applications which are still at the level of  visions. It will be argued 
that a reflection of  the challenges of  the future for the current (present) discourse on 
technological developments is a new and promising field of  reflection. Longer detached 
from an engagement solely with the consequences of  technological development, the new 
analysis will be more comprehensive and lie at the interface between epistemology, ethics 
and politics. 
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1. Nanoethics is difficult  
 
Nanotechnology has been widely perceived as the key technology of  the 21st 
century, since it was expected to both produce entirely new materials and to 
revolutionize production processes in virtually all industrial branches (cf. 
European Commission 2004). Nanotechnologies, as enabling technologies, 
are now widely diffused and researched, although until now there has been 
no revolution. The hype around the promises and expectations of  the 
“nanorevolution” has stimulated an ethical debate, also because the 
nanotechnological “reshaping of  the world” (cf. National Science and 
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Technology Council 1999) has been linked with a larger project of  improving 
human performances: Nanotechnologies have been seen as one of  the four 
areas of  convergence in the NBIC concept (Roco and Bainbridge 2002). The 
ethical debate on nanotechnologies, almost two decades old, appears 
extremely heterogeneous due to two main factors: the lack of  a worldwide 
accepted definition of  nanomaterials (at least for a long time) and the 
unclarity about both the appropriate method of  analysis as well as the 
ranking of  the issues at stake. 
For a long time there has been a long debate around what can be 
classified as nanomaterial and thus which kind of  technologies are 
nanotechnologies, because there was no worldwide commonly shared and 
general definition of  nanotechnology beyond a general identification of  the 
study and control of  matter at the molecular and atomic scales (i.e. a 
definition which gives a precise range, or which refers to fields of  
application). Indeed, with very few exceptions, it is difficult to find any kind 
of  matter that would not qualify as an object of  such nanoscale research: 
every branch of  experimental science and technology nowadays deals with 
material objects structured at the nanoscale. There have been various efforts 
in different continents to find a definition, which are influenced by the topics 
regarded as the most important in the local context. In Australia for 
example there has been a huge debate about the size of  nanoparticles in 
suncreams. Recently, the EU has adopted the “Recommendation on the 
definition of  a nanomaterial”, which is provisionary until it will be reviewed 
in December 20141 “in the light of  experience and of  scientific and 
technological developments”. This Recommendation defines a nanomaterial 
solely based on the size of  the constituent particles of  a material (between 1 
and 100 nanometers), without regard to hazard or risk. For the European 
Commission the necessity of  confining the definition solely to properties 
connected to the scale has been motivated by the need to formulate a 
definition which can be broadly applicable in Union legislation and to be in 
line with other approaches worldwide, as it is stated in the Recommendation.  
                                                            
1 According to this Recommendation a nanomaterial means: “A natural, incidental or 
manufactured material containing particles, in an unbound state or as an aggregate or as 
an agglomerate and where, for 50 % or more of  the particles in the number size 
distribution, one or more external dimensions is in the size range 1 nm - 100 nm”. The 
definition will be used primarily to identify materials for which special provisions might 
apply e.g. risk assessment or ingredient labeling. 
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Despite this attempt, there is still disagreement of  what 
nanotechnologies are and whether they can be distinguished from 
nanoscience: For example the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of  
Engineering (2004) define nanotechnology as encompassing a wide range of  
tools, techniques and potential applications, and nanoscience as the study of  
phenomena and manipulation of  materials at atomic, molecular and 
macromolecular scales, where properties differ significantly from those at a 
larger scale. Due to the multiplication of  activities around nanotechnologies, 
Sweet and Bradford (2006) have pointed out the unusualness of  agreement 
around this definition. This disagreement can be explained not only as a 
technical matter (cf. Decker et al. 2004; Schummer 2004), but also as a 
political one: Weber (2008) for example has proposed to see nanotechnology 
as an empty signifier and as a political project that serves certain interests 
and strategies, acting as a technosocio-political innovation strategy for 
economic expansion. 
As already noticed (Ferrari 2010), the lack of  a worldwide accepted 
definition of  nanomaterials is both epistemologically and ethically relevant, 
because it influences – or at least it has influenced for a long time – the 
setting and legitimization of  scientific research areas and therefore the scope 
of  the research (in particular through priority setting, which can vary 
through different countries, cf. Schummer 2004). Furthermore, this lack can 
open or confine the ethical discourse, depending on which issues are 
perceived as relevant. In particular, questions of  risks connected to 
nanomaterials are often discussed with other more general and visionary 
goals of  possible future developments of  nanotechnologies, such as human 
enhancements or particular applications in nanomedicine.  
One of  the main questions which have characterized the beginning of  
the nanoethical debate has been whether we need a new field of  ethical 
inquiry and whether these technologies pose new questions (cf. Ferrari 2010). 
For Ball (2003), there is no need for a new field of  ethical inquiry because the 
questions are the same as in the field of  biotechnology. Although Moor and 
Weckert (2004) recognize that there are nascent but important concerns 
regarding nanotechnology, they remain in a central position: they do not 
want, on the one hand, to disregard most of  the risks associated to applying 
nanotechnology because the technology itself  is in its infancy but, on the 
other hand, they do not want that the ethical evaluation comes too late. 
Authors who focus more on issues of  the individual, such as questions of  
autonomy and privacy or of  risk perception and the legitimacy of  changing 
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‘human nature’, often see the nanoethical debate as a development of  a more 
general bioethical framework (Ebbesen et al. 2006). Other authors confine 
their analysis to specific fields of  application of  nanotechnologies, such as 
the European Group of  Ethics in Science and New Technologies in its 
statement on nanomedicine, in which they call for the use of  principles of  
biomedical ethics in untangling the challenges of  nanotechnologies (EGE 
2006). 
Nanotechnologies are emerging technologies, characterized by an 
extreme heterogeneity of  the fields of  application. Therefore many authors 
call for treating the issues differently regarding the specific context or field 
of  application (Ferrari 2010; cf. also Spagnolo and Daloiso 2009).  
 
 
2. Nanoethics is boring 
 
Although the variety of  different concerns regarding nanotechnologies has 
been recognized, there is a diffused dissatisfaction in the debate. Many 
authors express the feeling that nanoethics has been reduced to a check list 
of  the various issues, which are common to other technological fields, and it 
has in some sense become boring now, since many issues are just repeated 
(Dupuy 2007; Ferrari 2010; Patenaude et al. 2011). 
 “How are we to understand the fact that the philosophical debate over 
nanotechnologies has been reduced to a clash of  seemingly preprogrammed 
arguments and counterarguments that paralyzes all rational discussion of  
the ultimate ethical question of  social acceptability in matters of  
nanotechnological development?” (Patenaude et al. 2011, Nanoethics: 285) 
As already discussed (Ferrari 2010), the nanoethical debate has shown 
some features which are typical of  the bioethical debate in general: the 
predominance of  an utilitarian approach and the ignorance of  important 
knowledge developed in other discourse, notably philosophy of  technology 
and STS, concerning the uncertainty and complexity of  technological 
developments as well as the moral and political nature of  artifacts in shaping 
the normative space of  new and emerging technologies. 
Especially in the debate around human enhancement (HE) (NBIC 
convergence), the discourse is characterized by a polarization both of  
positions (foremost concerning issues of  human nature, cf. Ferrari 2008) and 
of  the way in which the issues are framed. Patenaude and his colleagues 
(2011) have noticed a “talking past each other” in this debate. In their 
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analysis of  the structure of  the arguments used in the debate they identify 
seven categories of  moral arguments which are based on epistemological 
stances which appear irreducible for two main reasons: first because there are 
different opinions on the possibility of  knowing moral obligations or the 
human condition as a moral fact; second, because there are different 
conceptions of  practical reasoning that correspond to the epistemological 
positions. 
Béland and his group (2011), analyzing the debate on converging 
technologies, have offered an explanation of  the impasse: first they argue 
that any given argument deployed (arguments based on nature and human 
nature, dignity, the good life) can serve as the basis for both the positive and 
the negative evaluation of  NBICs. Second, they point out that it is 
impossible to provide these arguments with foundations that will enable 
others to deem them acceptable and, third, that it is difficult to apply these 
same arguments to a specific situation. Finally they point out that moral 
arguments are ineffective in a democratic society, because decisions should be 
taken on a democratic base and thus normative issues have a political 
dimension.  
All these analysis are valuable and interesting, but they cannot really 
offer an alternative to the “impasse” of  the debate. On the one hand they 
indicate that there is something important around questions about human 
finitude, the role of  technological development in the society and the values 
which frame it. On the other hand, the debate cannot escape large degrees of  
generality; it tends to remain abstract and unsatisfactory, and thus difficult 
to translate for public engagement exercises.  
Following Weber (2008), we can observe that nanotechnology not only 
works as an empty signifier regarding its socio-economic role, but also its 
ethical one. Depending on which kind of  ethical issues are perceived as 
relevant to the field of  nanotechnologies, different interests and strategies 
are served in the debate. If  the main problems concern the risks of  new 
nanomaterials, the debate concentrates on issues regarding the most 
appropriate risk assessment framework to address environmental, health and 
safety (EHS) concerns and the need to stimulate public engagement. If, 
however, the main issues regard nanotechnologies as enabling technologies in 
the context of  converging technologies or, in general, for enhancing human 
properties, other issues become relevant, such as the normative stance of  
human nature, the desiderability on technological interventions modifying 
species-specific characteristics as well as the societal role of  technological 
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development. Although in the second case the issues seem broader, at closer 
look, we see that again the way in which issues are framed is again the one 
that regarding risks and benefits (cf. Allhoff/Lin 2008).  
In describing consequentialism as the starting point of  the so called 
NEST ethics (the ethics of  new and emerging technologies), i.e. the thinking 
about the possible consequences of  technological developments, Swiestra 
and Rip point out:  
“In practice, NEST-ethics starts with a consequentialist pattern of  
ethical argumentation: the new and emerging technology is deemed 
desirable, or not, because its consequences are desirable, or not. Since such 
consequences are still speculative, they have the form of  promises, or 
warnings and concerns when put forward in an action-oriented context. 
NEST-ethical discussion typically starts with the promises made by 
scientists and technologists and those who identify with their message about 
the new options.” (Swierstra and Rip 2007: 11)  
The thinking about possible consequences, i.e. risks and benefits of  
technologies, takes the form of  a thinking about the future and thus of  a 
reflection about expectations and promises of  developments which, in many 
cases, have not yet taken place. De facto a large part of  the nanoethical 
debate is characterized by the attempt to find plausible forms of  applying an 
enriched form of  risk-benefit analysis on possible future development (cf. 
Ferrari 2010). What appears here to be largely disregarded concerns the 
special nature of  promises and expectations, more precisely the ethical role 
of  (nano)technological visions.  
 
 
3. Regaining enthusiasm for nanoethics through looking at the future 
 
In the very recent debate there are emerging attempts to regain the sense of  
the future in talking about ethics, influenced by the studies in the field of  
philosophy of  technology, technology assessment, STS and sociology of  
expectations. In particular the so-called Collingridge Dilemma, originally 
formulated in 1980, has gained renewed attention: This dilemma states that 
although in principle it is easier to influence the course of  events in the early 
phases of  scientific and technological development, it is precisely in this 
early stage that the required knowledge that would enable one to intervene 
in a constructive manner is absent. In new reflections on emerging 
technologies, there is a sense that preparatory ethical reflection on 
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technologies which are in their infancy has to deal with specific challenges: 
This reflection has no longer to be conceived as an application of  principles 
or rules which are commonly shared in society, but it has to take into 
account the multifaceted and complex nature of  technological developments 
which are yet to happen or not in the future. As Wynne (2006) already 
suggested, we do not have to conceive the ethical reflection on 
nanotechnology as a reflection on nanoscale objects or processes but rather 
as a “reflection on human relations, imaginations, meanings, commitments, 
and normative visions of  valued ends which human knowledge and 
technology-making should be devoted to” (Wynne 2006, p. 2). An ethics that 
looks at future technological developments is, therefore, a reflection in the 
present but which deals with promises, expectations and imagination on 
possible trajectories, which may or may not happen.  
Palm and Hansson (2006) have proposed an ethical technology 
assessment (eTA), based on indicators of   negative ethical implications at an 
early stage of  technological development, which can subsequently be used to 
guide design or technology policy. The focus of  eTA is on the whole life-cycle 
of  technology development, from initial R&D to ultimate impacts on society, 
and it takes place by confronting projected features of  the technology or 
projected social consequences with ethical concepts and principles, in 
particular focusing on possible conflicts of  interests. The knowledge on these 
possible conflicts may then be used to adjust design processes to avoid ethical 
concerns or to steer decision-making on an emerging technology. Palm and 
Hansson (2006) then propose an ethical checklist of  nine issues as the most 
common in emerging technologies (privacy, sustainability, issues of  control, 
influence and power and issues of  gender, minorities and justice).  
In 2011, Stahl has elaborated a new method for the ethical assessment of  
emerging information and communication technologies (ICTs), which gained 
the name from a project he was involved in: the ETICA approach (Stahl 
2011). Despite the focus on ICTs, this approach contains general issues which 
can be applied to other fields of  emerging technologies. This approach, 
which consists of  three stages2, relies on multiple futures methods and 
studies, under the assumption that while individual studies will contain 
                                                            
2 The first stage consists in the identification of  the issues; in the second, the evaluation 
stage, the ethical issues are evaluated, ranked and ordered in relation to each other. In a 
third and final stage, the governance stage, governance recommendations are developed 
for policy makers for dealing with the ethical issues described in the earlier stages. 
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biases and shortcomings, their aggregate use will tend to yield more reliable 
results. It aims at arriving at a foresight analysis, choosing then the future 
considered the most desirable or important.  
The role of  ethics as a reflection projected to the future is the starting 
point of  the anticipatory technology ethics (ATE) approach proposed by 
Brey in 2012, based on three levels of  ethical analysis: the technology, the 
artifact and the application level.  At the technology level, the ethical 
analysis focuses on features of  the technology at large, particular subclasses 
of  it, or techniques within it, considering ethical issues inherent to the 
character of  the technology, issues that pertain to consequences that are 
likely to manifest themselves in any or nearly any artifact or application of  
the technology, or issues pertaining to risks that the technology will result in, 
artifacts or applications that are morally problematic. At the artifact level, 
the analysis considers features of  artifacts that present moral issues, due to 
the inherent character of  the artifact, or to its consequences in most or all of  
its uses, or to the controversial nature of  some of  its potential applications. 
At the application level, the ethical analysis focuses on particular ways of  
using an artifact or procedure, or on particular ways of  configuring it for use 
(Brey 2012). 
The constructive technology assessment and the socio-technical scenario 
approach, developed in STS and TA studies originally by Rip (Rip et al. 
1995; Schot and Rip 1997), focus on the futuristic character of  new and 
emerging technologies and are informed by the socio-constructivist idea of  a 
coevolution between science and society: Precisely because technological 
developments are not to be seen as separated from the rest of  society but 
they are in a mutual shaping relationship with it, it is possible to steer 
technological patterns even at early stages. Rip and te Kulve (2008) have 
then applied this idea to analyze nanotechnologies: Since many 
nanotechnology applications remain little more than promises, for these 
authors the study of  their implications can be seen as exercise in “social 
science fiction” based on the identification of  complex and overlooked 
interactions between actors. The aim of  the socio-technical scenarios, 
adopted in the Netherlands by a number of  organizations including the 
Rathenau Institute and the Dutch national nanotechnology consortium, 
NanoNed, is to stimulate a reflexive change, and to broaden thetechnological 
development by including more aspects and more actors at an early stage.  
Socio-technical scenarios and constructive TA are not ethical reflections 
in the strict sense: however, they play an important function in broadening 
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the normative horizon to the considerations of  relationships between 
different actors and how different articulations of  the socio-technical 
developments can lead to different results. Central idea of  social-
constructivism is namely the possibility of  steering the process of  
technological development. As a consequence, an analysis of  possible future 
developments cannot be static, i.e. an application of  principles or criteria to 
some material developments in the future, but is a “process in the making”, 
in which technological developments change permanently through the 
interaction with society. In better words, there are no strict technological 
developments in the future, but socio-technical developments, therefore the 
ethical analysis should take this dynamicity into account. Thus besides the 
engagement with hard impacts of  technologies (such as new knowledge and 
structural changes), it is important also to explore “soft impacts”: Trying to 
anticipate how technology, morality and their interaction can evolve is the 
task of  the techno-ethical scenarios approach, developed in the Netherlands 
by Swierstra and his group (Swierstra et al. 2009; Boenink et al. 2010). This 
method is based on an assessment of  expectations’ plausibility focused on 
statements on technological feasibility, societal usability, and desirability of  
the expected technology, together with a reflection on potential changes in 
morality bound to the expected technology (Lucivero et al. 2011). Since 
scientific and technological development coevolves with society, not only 
material changes are to be expected from technological developments, but 
also changes concerning morality. Therefore, the task of  the ethicist is also to 
spur the imagination of  the so called “techno-moral change” and to engage 
in a deep reflection, which has to be horizontally and vertically broadened:  
The horizontal extension concerns the number of  people and the 
background knowledge against which to judge certain claims by including 
different sources of  information as well as different stakeholders. The 
vertical extension regards the need to feed the discussions and assessments 
with historical knowledge, so that the plausibility of  claims on behalf  of  
emerging technologies can be grounded in experience, at least to some extent 
(Lucivero et al. 2011). 
Common to the previous approaches is the thinking that if  we are 
assessing technological visions, we should explicitly acknowledge that. 
Despite their differences, these approaches concentrate on the fact that 
technologies will materialize, that they will coevolve with society and that 
we therefore need (new) methods for developing the best possible scenarios or 
to understand possible changes in moral attitudes and conflicts arising from 
From Nanoethics to the Normativity of  Technological Visions 
 
229 
 
the contingent nature of  technologies. These attempts, therefore, try to 
respond in different ways to the dissatisfaction towards an ethical analysis 
which tends to ignore the fact that it is analyzing technological visions and 
not already existing applications, thus it performs a speculative analysis. 
Following (Nordmann 2007), the speculative ethics suffers from  
 “a radical foreshortening of  the conditional, that is, … what one 
might call the ‘if  and then’ syndrome. An if-and-then statement opens by 
suggesting a possible technological development and continues with a 
consequence that demands immediate attention. What looks like an 
improbable, merely possible future in the first half  of  the sentence, appears 
in the second half  as something inevitable. And, as the hypothetical gets 
displaced by a supposed actual, an imagined future overwhelms the present” 
(Nordmann 2007, p. 32). 
The ‘if  and then’ -syndrome presents technological visions which are 
presented as (almost) already there, thus not only distracting from more 
urgent questions, but also supporting expectations, serving more or less 
implicitly as a research agenda. Furthermore it transmits a naive and false 
picture of  how technologies develop (not paying attention to the history of  
contingency and surprises in the technological development). As already 
argued for a particular field of  cognitive enhancement (Ferrari et al. 2012), 
some academic debates around specific technologies develop on their own 
without taking in account whether the technological developments they are 
referred to are technologies in the pipeline or technological visions projected 
for a distant future. This runs the risk to transform entire discussions into 
“phantom debates” (cf. Quednow 2011), as the debate on pharmaceutical 
cognitive enhancement has shown (Ferrari et al. 2012).  
Moreover, from a political point of  view the engagement in speculative 
ethics provides a general and often implicit justification of  the current status 
quo. It is often argued that technologies will come and that then we need to 
engage as soon as possible with potential ethical consequences. This way of  
framing the discourse does not only suffer from technodeterminism (cf. 
Cooper 1999; Fox and Swazey 2008), but it rules out the possibility of  saying 
no to a technology (cf. Nordmann and Schwarz 2010). In this way, therefore, 
the normative reflection runs the risk of  losing its principal task, which is to 
investigate radical questions also through challenging current frameworks of  
technological development. In thinking about future technological 
development, abstract ethical arguments which remained detached from 
political questions appear limited and poor, precisely because they avoid to 
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engage with the situatedness of  this development in a concrete socio-
economic context as well as the power of  technological visions in present. 
 
 
4. Reshaping normative reflection through visions 
 
Due to the previously shown forthcomings in the current ethical debate on 
new and emerging technologies, we believe that the ethical reflection needs 
to be broadened by recovering a different sense of  time when analyzing the 
challenges posed by technological visions. The openness of  the future, which 
was recognized by the approaches previously mentioned, regards both the 
way in which technologies will materialize as well as the social, economic and 
political context in which they will develop. Despite their differences, the 
previous approaches tend to perform a pragmatic analysis, the one which 
probably fits at best with the idea of  socio-constructivism, since it is 
interested in exploring new moral possibilities (in this case coming from new 
technological developments) (cf. Keulartz 2004). However, the engagement 
with the future can also follow different patterns and lead to a larger 
reflection, engaging with elements coming from other philosophical areas as 
well as other disciplines.  
Reshaping normative reflection in relation to ideas of  future 
technological developments begins with a deep rethinking about the task of  
the analysis. From the explicit acknowledgement of  the fact that we very 
often deal with technological visions in new and emerging technologies 
should follow a different kind of  analysis with respect to the traditional 
bioethical framework. Even if  for the ethical discussion of  already existent 
technological applications (such as some nanomaterials or some 
nanoproducts) or already in the pipeline the methods of  applied ethics can 
be fruitful (mostly if  they are alsolinked with a critical analysis of  societal 
values), in the case of  possible technological developments in a distant future 
the analysis needs to be more comprehensive. If  we want to avoid 
technological determinism, we have to acknowledge the fact that 
technological visions, such as for example the idea of  “reshaping the world 
atom by atom” (cf. National Science and Technology Council 1999) or to 
enhance particular human capabilities, may or may not happen not only 
because we do not know whether a technology will succeed or not, but also 
because this depends on political decisions in the present. Technological 
visions are constructed by different actors, deeply entangled with their 
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attitudes, knowledge, perceptions, values, world views and interests. 
Precisely for these reasons, technological visions act in the “immanence of  
the present” (cf. Grunwald 2006), since they develop in particular cultural 
context, on the basis of  interpretations of  current knowledge. As for 
example indicated for pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement, the normative 
questions are very concrete and regard the present, such as the opportunity 
to spend financial and human resources in the research for substances, to 
change the regulation system in the case of  clinical trials as well as other 
reform in the health care system (Ferrari et al 2012).  
For recovering a different sense of  the future in the normative analysis 
of  technological developments, different reflections on the sense of  time and 
on the engagement with the future have been developed. In order to avoid 
speculative ethics, Grunwald (2010) has proposed to engage in an 
explanatory philosophy of  nanotechnology that works as a preparation for 
future applied ethics. This form of  philosophical analysis, later also 
conceptualized as hermeneutics of  technological futures (Grunwald 2012), is 
necessarily as broaden as the field of  (applied) ethics, involving 
epistemological, anthropological, hermeneutical and social reflection. In 
particular, in order to assess the normative nature of  technological visions 
Grunwald (2004, 2010) has elaborated the concept of  vision assessment, 
which mainly consists of  two steps: 1) deconstruction of  the elements which 
comprise such futures (knowledge, uncertainties, ad hoc assumptions, values, 
etc.) and their ‘construction’ to create one picture of  the future; 2) an 
assessment of  the validity or plausibility of  these elements and of  the 
overall ‘rationality’ of  this future scenario as compared to the rationality of  
other alternative scenarios.  
Vision assessment as a form of  TA (dealing with the future) has been 
criticized by Nordmann (2010), who perceives it as a typical instrument of  
technoscientific thinking since it is based on the idea of  the possibility of  
shaping the future. Since for Nordmann (2011) technoscience is 
characterized no longer by a (purely) theoretical curiosity and truth-seeking 
attitude, but rather by the acquisition of  basic capabilities of  visualisation, 
manipulation, modeling nature, the image of  a future (not yet existent) 
which can be constructed through the instruments of  the present is an 
expression of  the technoscientific logic. The very fact that the Collingridge 
dilemma is considered a dilemma that is in need of  a solution reveals that 
efforts in the present to avoid it constructing countermeasures are efforts 
directly to maintain control (cf. Liebert and Schmidt 2010). Whether the 
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future in the science mode is conceptualized as the time in which knowledge, 
oriented towards a state of  truth, justice and beauty is subjected to an 
indefinitely long process of  criticism, in the technoscientific mode future 
indicates the time in which the attainment of  physical control or the 
working of  a device is self-vindicating: In particular, in the case of  
nanotechnologies there is the idea of  multiple nanotechnological possibilities 
waiting to be realized, so that the future appears an intensification of  the 
present, as a fulfillment of  present promises (Nordmann 2010). As 
alternative Nordmann proposes a “forensic of  wishing” as an analysis of  
texts in which promises and expectations are produced, but avoiding the idea 
of  shaping the future: 
“This kind of  TA, as a forensic technoscience, is no longer in danger of  
becoming absorbed into the spirit of  technoscience by assimilating the 
technoscientific hubris of  “shaping the future”. Instead, it takes as its 
starting point the age of  technoscience with its impoverished conception of  
the future as the mere realisation of  technical possibilities. By assessing this 
conception with its logic of  wishfulfilment it becomes a critical observer 
rather than implicit promoter of  technoscientific hubris” (Nordmann 2010: 
13).  
A reflection of  the challenges of  the future for the current (present) 
discourse on technological developments is a new field of  reflection. Longer 
detached from an engagement solely with the consequences of  technological 
development, the new analysis will be more comprehensive and lie at the 
interface between epistemology, ethics and politics. It will play a 
fundamental role in the years to come, since new and emerging technologies 
are multiplying and they are more and more shaped along goals, rather than 
through a well-defined context of  research. Perhaps the time is mature for 
engaging (again) in a deep philosophical reflection on the sense of  time, as 
the different conceptualization of  the future in science and technoscience 
described by Nordmann suggest. This reflection will necessarily also 
encompass an engagement with the past, since many ideas which currently 
shape visionary projects are connected with utopias and dystopias of  
previous centuries (cf. Coenen et al. 2010) and they also can be seen as 
reactions to the scarcity discourse which emerged in the 70ies (cf. McCray 
2012). All in all, time has now become an essential object of  reflection for 
disentangling the normativity of  technologies.  
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